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Abstract
This article explores the relationship between law and more specifically international law with 
territory and borders and how this relationship manifests itself in cyberspace. It claims that it 
manifests itself through two processes: a process of territorialisation of cyberspace that is, the 
application of territorial notions of international law to persons, activities, and objects existing 
or operating in or through cyberspace and, secondly, in States asserting their sovereignty in 
cyberspace by creating national cyberspace zones. All in all, its main claim is that borders are 
still relevant in the legal regulation of cyberspace. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Law and borders –geographic or normative - have an intimate 
relationship. One may even say that they share some form of a 
causal relationship. On the one hand, a law produces and determines 
borders whereas, on the other, borders produce and determine laws. 
The relationship between law and borders is even more pronounced 
in international law where borders and indeed territorial borders play 
a constitutive as well as a functional role in international law. First, 
borders are constitutive of states and, consequently, they are constitutive 
of international law. To explain, states are territorially bounded entities; 
they represent exclusive authority over a discrete patch of territory. 
International law is the product of interactions between such bounded 
authorities. Borders thus define international law’s source of authority; 
without states, there would be no international law. Second, borders play 
a functional role by demarcating international law to wit, by separating 
international law from domestic law. They determine in other words 
what lies inside and becomes the subject of domestic law and what lies 
outside and becomes the subject of international law. Borders are also 
functional in that they demarcate international law’s different domains, 
for example, international criminal law, environmental law and so on. 
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The application of each domain depends on criteria and conditions laid 
down by international law. In this sense, one can speak of normative 
borders rather than physical ones. All these show that borders shape our 
conception of international law and of the regulatory frameworks that 
apply to international phenomena. 
This paper will explain the relationship between borders and 
international law in cyberspace and its implications for the legal 
governance of cyberspace. This is an important endeavour because 
cyberspace and its features of a-territoriality and borderlessness 
seem to defy traditional notions of international legal regulation. The 
question then of whether international law can act as a regulatory tool in 
cyberspace and, if it does, what is the scope of its regulatory competence 
and the question of whether states can remain the source of regulation in 
cyberspace are closely linked to the question of whether the constitutive 
and functional role of borders can be replicated in cyberspace. The latter 
question lies behind the debates on cyber regulation and will be tackled 
in this article. 
The article will thus proceed by elucidating in the second section the 
relationship between international law, borders, territory, and statehood. 
The third section will throw a critical gaze on the existing debates 
concerning the place and role of international law in cyberspace. The 
fourth section will examine the phenomenon of territorialisation of 
cyberspace and its implications for the application of international law 
to cyberspace whereas the fifth section will examine the phenomenon of 
realigning sovereignty and cyberspace. It is hoped that by understanding 
the relationship between international law, borders, and sovereignty, 
this will assist us in understanding how legal governance in cyberspace 
emerges and is shaped. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW, BORDERS, TERRITORY, AND 
STATES
A cursory look at any international law textbook reveals the 
relationship between international law and states. International law 
is traditionally defined as the law that regulates the relations between 
states as sovereign formations. According to Vattel “[t]he law of nations 
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is the law of sovereigns”1 and according to a contemporary textbook 
“[p]ublic international law covers relations between states in all their 
myriad forms …”2 This immediately raises the question of what is a 
state and what is the relationship between states, borders, and territory 
in international law.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States3 provides a definition of ‘state’ by identifying its constitutive 
elements. According to Article 1 of the Convention, “the State as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: 
(1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) government; and 
(4) capacity to enter into relations with other states.” 
Notwithstanding any criticism of under-inclusiveness leveled against 
this definition, it has acquired customary law status4 not only because 
it codified views already existing at the time of its adoption but also 
because, since its adoption, it has been confirmed on many occasions 
in international jurisprudence. For example, as early as 1929, it was 
opined in the Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft arbitration that 
“[a] State does not exist unless it fulfills the conditions of possessing a 
territory, a people inhabiting that territory, and a public power which 
is exercised over the people and the territory.”5 More recently, the 
Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia6 
1  Emer de Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliques à 
la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains, [The Law of Nations, or, 
Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and 
Sovereigns] translated by Charles G. Fenwick, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 
1916), in Classics of International Law, para xvi. [hereafter referred to as DdG]
2  Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., CUP, 2003, p. 2.
3  The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, signed on 26 December 
1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934) art. 1; James Crawford, 
The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, 2006; James 
Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law, vol. 48, 1977, p. 93-182.
4  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law 
Institute, 1987, § 201.
5  Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellshaft v. Polish State (Germano-Polish Mixed Arbi-
tral Tribunal) 1 August 1929, 5 ILR 11, p. 14-15.
6  Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1, 
reprinted in Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee a Sec-
ond Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, EJIL vol 1, no. 3, 1992, p. 182. 
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opined that “the state is commonly defined as a community which 
consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political 
authority and that such a state is characterised by sovereignty”.
The requirement of defined territory in Article 1 of the Convention 
alludes to borders. Defined territory means demarcated territory that 
is, discrete territory separated from other territories. 7 If this element 
in the Montevideo definition of states is combined with the element of 
government, territory represents the container over which an authority 
exercises supreme and exclusive power8   demarcate the geographic, 
personal and functional scope of such power and distinguish said 
territory from other territories over which different authorities exercise 
exclusive power. Put slightly differently, the territory is the substratum 
of state authority whereas borders define the allocation of authority 
between states. As Allen Buchanan put it “territory [means] the area that 
is circumscribed by boundaries of political units. Land is a geographical 
concept; the territory is political and, more specifically, a judicial 
concept.”9 The total, supreme and exclusive power over such territory 
is called sovereignty. The state as an institution thus embodies a claim 
of sovereignty over certain territory.10 In the words of Judge Humber in 
7  Although borders need not be precisely defined as for states to emerge, there needs 
to be, at least, a continuous and defined portion of territory over which power is exer-
cised. As the ICJ held in the North Seas Continental Shelf cases: “The appurtenance 
of a given area, considered as an entity, in no way governs the precise delimitation 
of its boundaries, any more than uncertainty as to boundaries can affect territorial 
rights. There is, for instance, no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully 
delimitated and defined, and often in various places and for long periods they are not, 
as is shown by the case of the entry of Albania into the League of Nations.” North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic 
of Germany/Netherlands), 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 32.
8  For Crawford, the requirement of territory is merely a component of the effective 
government criterion rather than a “distinct criterion of its own.” Crawford, The Cre-
ation of States in International Law, see note 4, p. 52
9  Allen Buchanan, “The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has 
to Say” in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore, eds., States, Nations, and Borders: 
The Ethics of Making Boundaries, CUP, 2003, p. 232-3.  
10  Stephen D. Krasner, “Westphalia and All That” in Judith Goldstein and Robert 
Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, 
Cornell University Press, 1993; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypoc-
risy, Princeton University Press 1999; Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International 
Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, International Organization, vol. 55, no. 2, 
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the Isle of Palmas case “territorial sovereignty serves to divide between 
nations space upon which human activities are employed”.11
Although territorial borders are now synonymous with states and 
international law, this has not always been the case. It was the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648 that is credited with the emergence of the modern 
concept of the state by recognising the exclusivity of political authority 
over distinct portions of territory.12 
Whether this is the case can be debated but the attribution of the 
modern system of sovereign states to the Peace of Westphalia is one of 
the foundational myths of international law13 and it is not my purpose to 
debunk this myth. Instead, my purpose is to use the Peace of Westphalia 
as a temporal marker in order to explain and compare the pre-and post-
Westphalian state of affairs as far as the relationship between authority, 
territory, and borders is concerned.
The pre-Westphalian order was characterised by a different 
organisation of authority which was not necessarily territorial or 
exclusive. That period was characterised by the unity of the Respublica 
Christiana with its segmented, often overlapping, and complex system 
of authority. Authority in that period was not over spaces but over places 
such as cities or over people through allegiances.14 There were also 
overlapping authorities within the same formation with the Pope being 
the highest authority without however yielding claim to any territory. 
What characterised these arrangements of authority was the fact that they 
were based on the notion of control and allegiance and thus obscured 
distinctions between external and internal authority which, as was said, 
define the modern concept of statehood and of international law. The 
concept of international law that applied in that period was closer to 
the Roman concept of jus gentium as the common law that applied to 
2001; Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948”, The American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 42, no. 1, 1948, p. 20.
11  Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas) (United States v Netherlands), 4 April 1928, 
RIAA II 839.
12  Peace of Westphalia, signed on 30 January 1648 and 24 October 1648.
13  Pope Innocent X condemned the treaty as “null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, 
damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time.” David Maland, 
Europe in the Seventeenth Century, Macmillan, 1966, p. 16.
14  Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, Volume 2, University of Chicago Press, 196.
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all people regardless of affiliation, place or situation15 rather than the 
law that applied to territorially separate authorities which represents the 
modern (post-Westphalian) definition of international law.16    
Grotius and Vattel, the ‘fathers’ of international law, provided 
theoretical support to the notion of sovereign, territorially bounded, 
states.17 They were both writing in an era where political theorists such 
as Bodin or Hobbes promoted sovereignty as an organising principle of 
political entities. Sovereignty for Bodin represented the consolidation 
of power: from fragmentation of powers, towards a central authority.18 
Whereas these theorists explored the internal aspects of sovereignty, 
Grotius and Vattel explored the external dimension and implications 
of sovereignty. Grotius decoupled authority and, thus sovereignty, 
from people or from the universal society. The former construction of 
authority was grounded on notions of personal allegiance and popular 
legitimacy whereas the latter was purely normative, based on political 
or religious allegiances among people. Both constructions of authority 
were subjective and, even more critically, fragmented and complexified 
the basis and scope of political authority. In  Grotius work, sovereignty 
became conterminous with the territory and with the state as the 
political institution representing that territory.19 In doing so, Grotius 
objectified and simplified the organisation and practice of sovereignty 
in that sovereignty as authority ceased to be dependent on affiliations 
or on allegiance but was determined by territorial borders which are 
physical and tangible. As a result, all persons and objects within borders 
fell under a state’s exclusive authority, irrespective of any religious, 
ethnic or other bonds and allegiances they may have had. Moreover, 
15  Justinian, The Institutes of Justinian, book 1, 15th ed., translation by Thomas Collett Sandars, Longmans 
1922, tit. II, para. 1. See also David J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity, CUP, 2001, p. 1-15.
16  Henry Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America: From the 
Earliest Times to the Treaty of Washington, 1842, Gould, Bank & Company, 1845, p. 
26.
17 Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and 
Its Relation to Modern Ideas, Peter Smith, 1970, p. 92-108.
18  Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la Republique, Chez Iacques du Puys, 1576, livre I, ch. 
8, p. 131; F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed., CUP, 1986.
19  Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis [The Law of War and Peace in Three Books], 
translation by Francis W. Kelsey, book 1, ch. III, § VII, Prolegomena, §§ 35-40, Clar-
endon Press, 1925.
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borders cut off any bonds and allegiances that may have existed with 
peoples living outside those borders, thus consolidating the exclusivity 
of state authority. For Vattel, the state is central tenet in his theory.20 
Vattel ponders on the legal implications of state sovereignty by relying 
on natural law concepts of independence and equality. As he wrote, 
civil societies require an “authority capable of giving commands, 
prescribing laws, and compelling those who refuse to obey. ... Such 
an idea is not to be thought of as between Nations. Each independent 
State claims to be, and actually is, independent of all others.”21 As a 
result, “the State, remains absolutely free and independent with respect 
to all other men, and all other Nations, as long as it has not voluntarily 
submitted to them.”22 
Although the process of state consolidation was gradual, the 
Westphalian conceptualisation of statehood as supreme and exclusive 
authority over a defined territory and its people - having dissolved any 
competing internal authorities – and externally recognising no other 
higher authority is omnipresent in international law.    
How this conceptualisation of statehood still defines international 
law can be demonstrated by looking into claims to statehood in the 
exercise of the right to self-determination in the colonial and post-
colonial context.23 
The right to self-determination denotes the right of peoples to 
determine freely their political status. At the basis of this right, 
particularly in the colonial era, is a claim to political authority over 
a certain territory which often leads to the formation of a new state. 
Borders have always played an important role in determining and 
20  DdG, see note 2, vol. III, para. 7a, note k.
21  DdG, see note 2 ,vol III,  para. 8a
22  DdG, see note 2, para. lv-lvi.
23  Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, art. 1(2), 55; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 1966 (en-
tered into force 3 January 1976), art 1(1); International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, adopted 16 December 1966 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art. 1(1); 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People, (14 
December 1960) UNGA Res 1514 (XV); Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations, 24 October 1970) UN GA Res. 2625 (XXV); 
Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, 
p. 102.
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shaping this right and, particularly, in determining not only the subject 
of the right to self-determination but also its content and scope. In 
the colonial context, the right to self-determination meant that it was 
colonial people located in areas defined by colonial borders that could 
exercise this right within the existing colonial borders, irrespective of 
whether the subject of the right -the ‘peoples’ - were a homogenous 
group, shared the same identity or had the same aspirations over territory. 
Hence,  borders and territory determined which people could exercise 
the right to self-determination as well as the territorial scope of the right 
and of the ensuing state authority, contrary to Judge Dillard’s musing 
that “It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and 
not the territory the destiny of the people”.24 The critical role of borders 
in the self-determination context was also confirmed by the principle 
of uti possidetis accepted by the then Organisation of African States25 
and by international jurisprudence. This principle confined the new 
states that emerged from the exercise of the right to self-determination 
to the previously drawn colonial borders irrespective of how arbitrary 
or artificial those borders may have been, and, regardless of whether 
they represented the territory over which the ‘peoples’ claiming self-
determination lived. Existing borders thus acted as law stabilisers and 
allowed new states to be immediately integrated into international law. 
As the ICJ opined, “the principle of uti possidetis freezes the territorial 
title; it stops the clock but does not put back the hands”.26 The ICJ 
further explained the role of uti possidetis27
“24. . . . There is no doubt that the obligation to respect pre-
existing international frontiers in the event of a State succession 
derives from a general rule of international law, whether or not the 
rule is expressed in the formula uti possidetis. […] 
25. However, it may be wondered how the time-hallowed principle 
has been able to withstand the new approaches to international law as 
24  Western Sahara (Separate opinion of Judge Dillard), 16 October 1975, ICJ reports 
1975, p. 122.
25  Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government Held in Cairo (Resolution 16(1), Border Disputes Among Af-
rican States), 17 to 21 July 1964.
26  Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 22 Decem-
ber 1986, ICJ Reports 1986 p. 568.
27  Ibid, p. 564.
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expressed in Africa, where the successive attainment of independence 
and the emergence of new States have been accompanied by a 
certain questioning of traditional international law. At first sight this 
principle conflicts outright with another one, the right of peoples 
to self-determination. In fact, however, the maintenance of the 
territorial status quo in Africa is often seen as the wisest course, to 
preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have struggled for 
their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive 
the continent of the gains achieved by many sacrifices. The essential 
requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually 
to consolidate their independence in all fields, have induced African 
States judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial frontiers, 
and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-
determination of peoples.”
The role of borders was also critical in the post-colonial exercise of 
the right to self-determination by peoples living within federal states. In 
this case, internal administrative borders which were drawn to delimit 
internal administrative competences were transformed into external 
borders, delimiting sovereign authorities and thus triggering the 
application of international law.28 The Arbitration Commission of the 
European Conference on Yugoslavia in an influential pronouncement 
declared that 
“it is well established that, whatever the circumstances, the right 
to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers 
at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the 
states concerned agree otherwise”.29 
The Commission also held in Opinion No. 3 that 
“[e]xcept where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become 
frontiers protected by international law. This conclusion follows from 
the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and in particular 
from the principle of uti possidetis. […]”30
28  “[I]t has to be remembered that no question of international boundaries could even 
have occurred to the minds of those servants of die Spanish Crown who established 
administrative boundaries” Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/
Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), 11 September 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 387-8
29  Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, 
reprinted in Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee a Sec-
ond Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, EJIL vol 1, no. 3, 1992, p. 184.
30  Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 3, 
reprinted in Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee a Sec-
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The preceding discussion also reveals the constitutive and functional 
role of borders in international law. In the process of state formation, 
borders demarcate actual claims to political authority over territories 
and in doing so they also contribute to the consolidation, unification, 
and centralisation of such authority. A state thus denotes the horizontal 
and vertical integration of authority over a certain territory. In this 
sense, borders are constitutive of states. Because borders define states 
and states are the foundational authority of international law, borders 
are also constitutive of international law; without states, international 
law would lack ontological meaning. They are also constitutive of 
international law because states are the genitor of international law; 
they create, implement and enforce international law. 
Furthermore, borders determine the political and geographic scope 
of a state’s authority by demarcating it from other authorities and 
they also demarcate the internal from the external dimension of state 
authority. In doing so they determine when and where international 
law applies to endow international law with functional relevance. The 
functional role of borders is also evident in the application of different 
law regimes or in relation to certain international rules such as the rules 
on non-intervention, non-use of force or self-defence which rely on the 
crossing of borders - physical or political-legal – to acquire meaning 
and relevance.31 For example, whether the law of international armed 
conflict or the law of non-international armed conflict applies in a 
particular situation depends on whether the hostilities cross a frontier. 
Similarly, the rule on non-intervention applies and acquires meaning 
when there is a physical crossing of a frontier or interference with the 
internal aspects of sovereignty. In this sense, borders determine what 
falls within and what fall outside a state’s sovereignty which is also 
critical in determining what is permissible and what is impermissible 
intervention. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 makes this clear when it says 
“violation of sovereignty occurs whenever one State physically 
crosses into the territory or national airspace of another State without 
either its consent or another justification in international law […]”.32
. 
ond Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, EJIL vol 1, no. 3, 1992, p. 185.
31  Charter of the United Nations, see note 24, art. 2(4) and 51.
32  Michael N. Schmitt, ed., see note 51, rule 4 para. 6.
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Whereas this section has explored the relationship between 
international law, states, territory, and borders, the next section will 
consider the viability of this relationship in cyberspace. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW, BORDERS, AND TERRITORY IN 
CYBERSPACE  
A common representation of cyberspace is that it is a-territorial and 
borderless and that for this reason, it cannot be subject to the law as 
recognised and practiced in the physical world. Instead, cyberspace is 
subject to different legal constructions. John Barlow’s Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace33 set the scene by rejecting the application 
of sovereignty and its concomitant laws to cyberspace. According to the 
declaration:  
“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh 
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On 
behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are 
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, 
….. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally 
independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no 
moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement 
we have true reason to fear.
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of 
the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. […] 
Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. […]
We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will 
arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world 
is different.
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought 
itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications. 
Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not 
where bodies live.
[…] 
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, 
and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and 
there is no matter here.
33  John P Barlow, “A Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace” (Davos, 1996), 
available at: https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence, accessed on 24 August 
2017
Nicholas Tsaugourias
534
Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain 
order by physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened 
self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our 
identities may be distributed across many of your jurisdictions. The 
only law that all our constituent cultures would generally recognize 
is the Golden Rule. We hope we will be able to build our particular 
solutions on that basis. But we cannot accept the solutions you are 
attempting to impose. […]
These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us 
in the same position as those previous lovers of freedom and 
self-determination who had to reject the authorities of distant, 
uninformed powers. We must declare our virtual selves immune to 
your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to your rule over 
our bodies. We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no one 
can arrest our thoughts.
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May 
it be more humane and fair than the world your governments have 
made before.”
The debate between Professors Johnston and Post on one hand 
and Professor Goldsmith on the other as to whether law and, more 
specifically, international law applies to cyberspace and how that law is 
created, applied and enforced is informed by different views about the 
role and relevance of borders and of territorially bounded sovereignty 
in cyberspace.34   
Johnson and Post reject the possibility of applying existing notions of 
sovereignty and law to cyberspace due to its distinct non-territorial and 
borderless character and, for this reason, they propose the development 
of discrete laws for cyberspace.35 According to them, in the physical 
world, borders determine the law that applies within a certain space 
and there is an overlap between the physical space represented by states 
and the ‘law-space’. However, the borderless character of cyberspace 
undermines the possibility of legal regulation because it challenges 
34  David R. Johnson & David Post, “Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space”, Stanford Law Review, 48, 1996, p. 1367; David Post, “Against ‘Against Cy-
beranarchy’”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, vol. 17, no. 4, 2002, p. 1365; Jack 
L. Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy”, University of Chicago Law Review, 65, 1998 
p. 1199; Jack L. Goldsmith, “The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial 
Sovereignty”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 5, no. 2., 1998, p. 475.
35  David R. Johnson & David Post, see note 34, p. 1367. 
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the bases upon which law is created and applied. More specifically 
cyberspace destroys the link between borders and four critical variables, 
to wit, power, legitimacy, effects, and notice.36 Power as an authority is 
as was said the essence of sovereignty and of statehood but the lack 
of borders deprives sovereigns of the ability to exercise power over 
defined territories and peoples and deprives sovereigns the legitimising 
effect of consent. The lack of borders also obscures the links between a 
cyber activity and a certain ‘law-space’ and undermines the exclusivity 
of power. It also deprives people from noticing when they enter a 
different ‘law space’. All the above pose challenges to law and, although 
cyberspace needs to be regulated, existing territorially based laws are 
not suitable to cyberspace. For this reason, the authors opt for a system 
of self-regulation of cyberspace by its participants.37 
Notwithstanding the forcefulness of their argument, it should be 
noted that Johnston’s and Post’s argument is not as radical as it seems 
because they do not reject the application of law or of international law 
to cyberspace and, moreover, they still rely on borders for purposes 
of law-creation, law-application and law-enforcement in cyberspace, 
albeit a different kind of borders. To explain, they do not deny that law 
has a role to play in cyberspace but they propose a different regulatory 
system which is more appropriate to the features of cyberspace. 
Secondly, although they reject the possibility of applying existing laws 
and law-making processes to cyberspace because they are territorially-
grounded and they are based on notions of physical borders, they do 
not reject the existence of borders in cyberspace. Instead, the authors 
introduce a different border consisting of screens and passwords which 
distinguish the virtual from the real world. This may be a monumental 
and non-physical border but a border nonetheless. Moreover, according 
to the authors, this border is placed around cyberspace and thus defines 
cyberspace as a space separate from real space. What transpires is that 
borders still play a constitutive as well as a functional role because they 
define the expanse that is called cyberspace and they determine what 
falls within the real and what falls within the virtual space. Thirdly, 
borders continue to define the organisation of power within cyberspace 
as a separate space. The difference with the physical world of states 
36  Ibid, p. 1370-6. 
37  Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books 2006) p. 3.
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is that, whereas in the latter case authority is organised and practiced 
within defined territories with no overarching power existing above 
them, in cyberspace, authority is unmediated, non-fragmented and 
conterminous with the borders of cyberspace. 
Johnson’s and Post’s position concerning the exceptional nature of 
cyberspace was challenged by Jack Goldsmith in his article “Against 
cyber anarchy”.38 For him, there is nothing unexceptional as far as 
cyberspace is concerned and that contrary views are much exaggerated. 
What, according to Goldsmith, needs to be realised is that cyberspace 
consists of persons and objects; thus states can exercise power over 
people and objects on their territory and regulate their activities. Such 
regulation has also by default extraterritorial effects expanding in this 
way the state’s regulatory power extraterritorially. Furthermore, there is 
an extension of the territorial scope of the law when the state regulates 
the local effects of extraterritorial activities. According to Goldsmith, 
traditional legal tools can resolve the multi-jurisdictional problems that 
arise and also address the issue of legitimacy and validity of the law. 
With regard to law-enforcement, Goldsmith criticises Johnson and Post 
for confusing the ability to enforce the law which exists in cyberspace 
with the cost of enforcement; for failing to recognize the deterrent effect 
of local enforcement; and for building their critique upon a notion of 
near-perfect enforcement. For him, the standard rules of enforcement 
based on a person’s location, on personal jurisdiction or extradition can 
also apply to cyber activities. Regarding the issue of notice, Goldsmith 
says that there is a general notice that data may cross frontiers. In sum, 
according to Goldsmith, territorial sovereigns can regulate cyberspace 
through existing techniques. Goldsmith furthermore makes a distinction 
between mandatory laws that apply across the board and default laws 
that apply to specific situations and may also apply to cyberspace, for 
example, the law concerning technical standards.    
The above represent views expressed at the early days of legal 
encounters with cyberspace and, as was explained, accept explicitly or 
implicitly the role of physical or normative borders in the application of 
the law to cyberspace. 
By now it is broadly accepted that international law applies to 
38  Jack L. Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy”, see note 34, p. 1199.
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cyberspace. For example, the 2013 report of the United Nations Group 
of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information 
and telecommunications in the context of international security [GGE] 
affirmed that international law, especially the UN Charter, applies to 
cyberspace and that State sovereignty and international norms and 
principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT-
related activities, and to jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within 
a State’s territory.39 According to the UN Secretary-General, the 
recommendations contained in the report “point the way forward for 
anchoring ICT security in the existing framework of international law and 
understandings that govern State relations and provide the foundation 
for international peace and security”.40 The 2015 GGE Report went a 
step further by spelling out specific international norms and principles 
that apply or should apply to cyberspace. The report lists 11 voluntary, 
non-binding norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of States 
aimed at promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT 
environment. They are the following:41
1. States should cooperate in developing and applying measures to 
increase stability and security in the use of ICTs and to prevent 
ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or that may 
pose threats to international peace and security;
2. states should consider all relevant information in case of ICT 
incidents including the larger context of the event, the challenges 
of attribution in the ICT environment and the nature and extent 
of the consequences
3. states should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for 
internationally wrongful acts using ICTs;
4. states should consider how best to cooperate to exchange 
information, to assist each other, and to prosecute terrorist and 
criminal use of ICTs
5. states should respect the UN resolutions that are linked to human 
39  UNGA, “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Infor-
mation and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security”, 24 June 
2013, UN Doc A/68/98, paras. 19-20.
40  Ibid, p. 4.
41  UNGA, “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Infor-
mation and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security”, 22 July 
2015, UN Doc A/70/174, para. 13.
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rights on the internet and to the right to privacy in the digital age
6. states should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity 
contrary to its obligations under international law that 
intentionally damages critical infrastructure;
7. states should take appropriate measures to protect their critical 
infrastructure from ICT threats;
8. states should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by 
other states whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious 
ICT acts;
9. states should take steps to ensure supply chain security, and 
should seek to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT and 
the use of harmful hidden functions;
10. states should encourage responsible reporting of ICT 
vulnerabilities and should share remedies to these.
11. states should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm 
the information systems of another state’s emergency response 
teams (CERT/CSIRTS) and should not use their own teams for 
malicious international activity;
Furthermore, the list of international law principles applicable to 
cyberspace includes42: 
1. state sovereignty;
2. sovereign equality;
3. the settlement of disputes by peaceful means;
4. refraining from the threat or use of force in international 
relations;
5. non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states;
6. respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The GGE failed to produce a report in 2017 due to lack of consensus 
on how specific norms and principles apply to cyberspace but, that 
notwithstanding, previous reports attest to the view that principles and 
norms developed for and applicable to the physical world and linked to 
42  Ibid, para 26.
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territorially bounded spaces are deemed to apply to cyberspace. This 
phenomenon can be described as the territorialisation of cyberspace; 
namely the application to cyberspace of territorialist and, by 
consequence, of sovereigns notions of authority and law.43 
IV. THE TERRITORIALISATION OF CYBERSPACE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In order to explain the epistemic premises of this phenomenon, it is 
important to explain the nature of cyberspace and whether cyberspace 
falls within the categorical schemes of territory and state sovereignty 
which, as explained above, define international law. According to Kuehl 
cyberspace is 
“a global domain within the information environment whose 
distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of electronics 
and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, 
and exploit information via interdependent and interconnected 
networks using information-communication technologies”.44
It transpires from this definition that cyberspace has a physical layer 
which consists of computers, integrated circuits, cables, communications 
infrastructure and the like; a logical layer which consists of the software 
logic data packets and electronics45 and a social layer which includes 
human beings. Consequently, a state can extend its sovereignty over 
the physical layer that is, over the infrastructure located on its territory. 
It can also exercise sovereign power over the social layer that is, over 
persons on its territory. The state can also assert its sovereignty over 
the effects of cyber activities that are felt on its territory regardless 
of their provenance. Furthermore, the state can assert its sovereignty 
over information that passes through its infrastructure or begins or 
43  Nicholas Tsagourias, “The Legal Status of Cyberspace” in Nicholas Tsagourias 
& Russell Buchan, eds., Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace, 
Edward Elgar, 2015; Geoffrey Herrera, “Cyberspace and Sovereignty: Thoughts on 
Physical Space and Digital Space”, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Victor Mauer, Sai Fe-
licia Krishna-Hensel, eds., Power and Security in the Information Age: Investigating 
the Role of the State in Cyberspace, Ashgate, 2007, p. 67-93.  
44  Daniel T Kuehl, “From cyberspace to cyberpower: Defining the problem” in Frank-
lin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, Larry K Wentz, eds., Cyberpower and National Secu-
rity (National Defense University Press, 2009, p. 28. [italics in the original]
45  Lior Tobanksy, “Basic concepts in cyber warfare”, Military and Strategic Affairs, 
vol. 3, no. 1, 2011, p. 77-78.
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ends on its territory. All the above show that existing international law 
norms which are territorially bounded can extend to and regulate cyber 
activities. 
This phenomenon can be understood better by using the alleged 
Russian interference in the 2016 US elections as an example.46 The 
incident involved hacking into the Democratic National Committee 
emails and the release by WikiLeaks of emails with information 
to embarrass or undermine the campaign of Hillary Clinton, the 
Democratic candidate. The incident thus involved the use of cyber 
infrastructure and cyber means to influence the US political process. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued a joint statement claiming that 
the Russian government was responsible for the hack and publication 
of the materials in its attempt to “interfere with the US election 
process.”47 According to reports, President Obama told President Putin 
that “international law, including the law for armed conflict, applies to 
actions in cyberspace”48 and considered US responses to the incident. 
The FBI49 report Joint Analysis Report: GRIZZLY STEPPE—Russian 
Malicious Cyber Activity reinforced the view that Russia was behind 
the WikiLeaks releases. Furthermore, according to the report Assessing 
Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic 
Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, the intention of the leaks was to 
46  Jens David Ohlin, “Did Russian Cyber interference in the 2016 Election Violate 
International Law?” Texas Law Review, no. 95, 2017.
47  Director of National Intelligence, “Joint Statement from the Department of Home-
land Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Secu-
rity” (7 October 2016), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-
statement-department-homeland-security-and-office-director-national, accessed on 
24 August 2017.
48  William M. Arkin, Ken Dilanian & Cynthia McFadden, “What Obama Said to 
Putin on the Red Phone About the Election Hack”, NBC News (19 December 2016), 
available at:
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/what-obama-said-putin-red-phone-about-
election-hackn697116, accessed on 24 August 2017.
49  U.S. Department of Homeland Security & Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Joint 
Analysis Report: GRIZZLY STEPPE—Russian Malicious Cyber Activity” (29 De-
cember 2016), available at: https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZL Y%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf, accessed on 24 August 
2017. 
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“undermine public faith in the US democratic process.”50  
Departing from the assumption that Russia was responsible for 
the hacking, the incident implicates two international law principles 
identified by the GGE as being applicable to cyberspace: one is 
the principle of sovereignty and the other is the principle of non-
intervention.51 These two principles are central to and, indeed, 
manifestations of the territorially-bound approach to international law. 
The principle of sovereignty denotes “the collection of rights held 
by a state”.52 These rights cover the internal as well as the external 
aspects of state sovereignty. As explained above, the internal aspect 
of sovereignty denotes summa potestas over territory and people;53 
that is, exclusive and supreme authority to regulate comprehensively 
human action and to enforce the law within a certain territory.54 The 
external aspect of sovereignty denotes the state’s supreme, original and 
total power in its international relations. Being all-encompassing, the 
principle of sovereignty can be dissected into more specific principles 
rights with non-intervention being one such specific right which has 
acquired independent legal status.55 Non-intervention protects the 
50  ICA, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections” in 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Background to “Assessing Russian 
Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber 
Incident Attribution” (6 January 2017) ICA 2017-01D, p. 1, available at: https://www.
dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf accessed on 24 August 2017. 
51  For the application of these principles to cyberspace see Michael N. Schmitt, ed., 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, CUP, 
2017, rules 1-4, rule 66. 
52  James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., OUP, 2012, 
p. 448. 
53  Samantha Besson, “Sovereignty” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclope-
dia of Public International Law, OUP, 2012.
54  “In short, authority concerns rule-making and control, rule-enforcement.” Janice 
E. Thomson, “State sovereignty in international relations: Bridging the gap between 
theory and empirical research”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 2, 1995, 
p. 213, 223.
55  Montevideo Convention, see note 4, art. 8; UNGA, “Declaration on Inadmissibility 
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of the Indepen-
dence and Sovereignty” 21 December 1965, UN Doc A/RES/20/2131; Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, see note 24; Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, paras. 202, 204. 
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internal dimension of sovereignty56 By prohibiting any coercive 
interference into the domestic affairs of a state.57 This has been expressed 
in the 1965 UN General Assembly resolution in the following words: 
“no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal […] affairs of any other state” and  every “state 
has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and 
cultural systems without interference in any form by another state’ As 
the ICJ also said in the Nicaragua case 
“the principle [of non-intervention] forbids all States or groups 
of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external 
affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly 
be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the 
principle of State sovereignty to decide freely”.58 
 The ICJ went on to offer examples of matters that fall within a 
state’s sovereign prerogative such as the choice of a political, economic, 
social and cultural system and the formulation of foreign policy. The 
list is not exhaustive59 and can change depending on developments in 
international law and relations but, if a state’s sovereign prerogatives 
are unduly compromised, the principle of non-intervention is violated. 
Applying the above considerations to the case at hand, would 
Russia’s alleged interference amount to unlawful intervention into 
US domestic affairs? According to Former Department of State Legal 
Adviser Brian Egan “a cyber operation by a State that interferes 
with another State’s ability to hold an election or that manipulates a 
State’s election results would be a clear violation of the rule of non-
intervention”.60 That notwithstanding, whether this is the case depends 
56  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see note 53, para. 
251: “The effects of the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty inevitably over-
lap with those of the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of noninter-
vention.”
57  Hersch Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim’s International Law: a treatise, vol. 1, D. 
McKay, 1955, p. 305; Robert Jennings and Adam Watts eds., Oppenheim’s Interna-
tional Law, Longman, 1996) p. 432.
58  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see note 53, para. 
205.
59  Ibid.
60  Brian J. Egan, “Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace at 
Berkeley Law School” (10 November 2016), available at: https://www.law.berkeley.
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on affirmatively answering two sub-questions: first, whether Russia’s 
action impinged on sovereign prerogatives; and, second, whether it 
was coercive. With regard to the first sub-question, the choice of a 
political system and the choice of government is a state prerogative; 
it is one of the highest manifestations of internal sovereignty. Hence, 
to the extent that Russia’s actions were intended to interfere with the 
political process of electing the next US President, they would have 
impinged on sovereign matters which should remain immune from 
outside interference. The answer to the second sub-question - whether 
the interference was coercive – is more nuanced. Coercion means that 
the will of the state is manipulated in order to do something that it would 
not otherwise do. Coercion is not the same as influence or interference 
but it is imperative pressure to do or to abstain from doing something. 
Put in different words, it is not an interference in sovereign prerogatives 
that constitutes unlawful intervention but interference in sovereign 
prerogatives that rises to the level of compulsion.61 Consequently, 
the answer to the question of whether Russian interference in the 
US electoral process constitutes intervention depends on whether the 
US electorate was actually compelled to vote for someone that they 
would not otherwise have voted for. In my opinion, Russia’s actions 
did not reach that threshold; they may have influenced some voters 
but it seems to not have compelled voters to change their mind since 
the targeted candidate - Hillary Clinton - received more votes than her 
opponent.62 The conclusion would have been different however if there 
was tampering with the voting machines.
If Russia’s meddling does not constitute unlawful intervention into 
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/egan-talk-transcript-111016.pdf, accessed on 24 
August 2017.
61  Dov H. Levin,
 “When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interven-
tions on Election Results”, International Studies Quarterly, vol 60, no 2, 2016, p. 
189–202. [it uses the word intervention in generic sense and not in the legal sense] 
62  Harriet Agerholm, “Hillary Clinton’s lead over Donald Trump in popular vote 
passes 2.5 million” (2 December 2016), available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/us-elections/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-popular-vote-lead-
25-million-a7451661.html, accessed on 24 August 2017. Contra Steven J. Barela, 
“Cross-Border Cyber Ops to Erode Legitimacy: An Act of Coercion”, (12 January 
2017) available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/36212/cross-border-cyber-ops-erode-
legitimacy-act-coercion, accessed on 24 August 2017. 
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US domestic affairs in the absence of coercion, will it amount to a 
violation of the principle of sovereignty? The view that it violated US 
sovereignty has been put forward by certain commentators.63 Whether 
this so depends on the content of the principle of sovereignty and on 
whether it is a legal norm, triggering legal consequences. 
As explained above, sovereignty is a ‘catch-all’ principle which can 
be dissected into more specific norms but remains the fall-back principle 
that captures any interference within a state’s exclusive internal and 
external authority which is not captured by other more specific rules 
such as those on non-intervention or non-use of force. For example, 
in the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ determined that US over flights of 
Nicaragua which did not constitute uses of force or intervention violated 
Nicaragua’s sovereignty.64 Hence, any interference in a state’s political 
process or decision-making power would violate its sovereignty even if 
it does not rise to the level of intervention. Moreover, any unauthorised 
interference with a state’s cyber infrastructure affecting its function 
or integrity would constitute a violation of that state’s sovereignty. 
That having been said, the next question is whether the principle 
of sovereignty is a legal norm whose violation can produce legal 
consequences.  Sovereignty is often referred to as a principle or a norm, 
both alluding to its more general nature in contrast to rules which are 
specific prescriptions or proscriptions. This fact alone or the fact that 
it has not been codified does not deprive it of legal status. Sovereignty 
constitutes a customary law norm having been recognised as such 
by states and courts. The ICJ has, for example, treated sovereignty 
as a legal norm in the Corfu Channel case where the Court held that 
“Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an 
essential foundation of international relations” and it went on by saying 
that “ … to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, 
the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a 
violation of Albanian sovereignty”.65 Likewise, in the Nicaragua case 
63  Sean Watts, “International Law and Proposed U.S. Responses to the D.N.C. Hack” 
(14 October 2016), available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/33558/international-
law-proposed-u-s-responses-d-n-c-hack, accessed on 24 August 2017.
64  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see note 53, paras 
88, 251
65  Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), 
9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 35, 36.
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the Court held that US over flights violate Nicaragua’s sovereignty.66 
In Costa Rica/Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that by “excavating three 
carios and establishing a military presence on Costa Rican territory, 
Nicaragua has violated the territorial sovereignty of Costa Rica”.67
It follows from the above that to the extent that sovereignty is a legal 
norm, interference with the US political process and the unauthorised 
entry into its cyber infrastructure to retrieve emails would amount to a 
violation of US sovereignty. 
V. REALIGNING SOVEREIGNTY AND CYBERSPACE
The preceding discussion has shown how international rules based 
on territorially-bound notions of sovereignty can apply to cyberspace. 
In this section, I will explain how states realign their sovereignty to 
cyberspace and in particular how states assert their sovereignty in 
cyberspace by curving out cyberspace into distinct areas corresponding 
to national territorial borders. Although, as was said previously, the 
application of the principle of sovereignty to cyberspace has been 
broadly accepted, certain states have particularly insisted on the notion 
of cyber sovereignty as the centrepiece of their political and legal 
approach to cyberspace and to cyber-regulation. China is such a state.68 
In 2010 a White Paper entitled “The Internet in China” was published 
which stressed the sovereign implications of the internet.69 In 2015, 
66  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see note 53, para 251.
67  Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nica-
ragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua 
v. Costa Rica), 16 December 2015, ICJ Reports 2015, para. 229.
68  Hao Yeli, “A Three-Perspective Theory of Cyber Sovereignty”, Prism: Journal of 
the Center for Complex Operations, vol 7, no. 2 (2017), 109, available at: http://cco.
ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/ prism_7-2/10-3-Perspective%20Theory.pdf 
accessed on 24 August 2017
69  “The Internet in China” (White Paper, 8 June 2010) available at: http://en.people.
cn/90001/90776/90785/7017201.html accessed on 24 August 2017, “IV. Basic Prin-
ciples and Practices of Internet Administration:
[…] China advocates the rational use of technology to curb dissemination of illegal 
information online. Based on the characteristics of the Internet and considering the 
actual requirements of effective administering of the Internet, it advocates the exer-
tion of technical means, in line with relevant laws and regulations and with refer-
ence to common international practices, to prevent and curb the harmful effects of 
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China and Russia together with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Kyrgyzstan, submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations a 
proposal of an ‘International Code of Conduct for Information Security’ 
which contained a pledge to respect the ‘sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of all States’.70 Chinese President 
Xi Jinping stressed the importance of cyber-sovereignty during his 
address to the Second World Internet Conference in Wuzhen in 2015 
and claimed that cyber sovereignty is critical to national sovereignty.71 
At the 7th International Safe Internet Forum conference in 2016, Fang 
BinXing member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and chief 
architect of China’s Golden Shield Project (Firewall) said ‘Sovereignty 
in general, and digital sovereignty in particular, is the inherent right 
of every nation and its citizens.’72 In 2016, China’s Ministry of Foreign 
illegal information on state security, public interests and minors. The Decision of 
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on Guarding Internet Security, 
Regulations on Telecommunications of the People’s Republic of China, Measures on 
the Administration of Internet Information Services, Measures on the Administration 
of Security Protection of the International Networking of Computer Information Net-
works, and other laws and regulations clearly prohibit the spread of information that 
contains contents subverting state power, undermining national unity, infringing upon 
national honor and interests, inciting ethnic hatred and secession, advocating heresy, 
pornography, violence, terror and other information that infringes upon the legitimate 
rights and interests of others. According to these regulations, basic telecommunication 
business operators and Internet information service providers shall establish Internet 
security management systems and utilize technical measures to prevent the transmis-
sion of all types of illegal information.”
70  Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia
n Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secre-
tary-General A/69/723 (13 January 2015)
71  “Why Does Cyber Sovereignty Matter?” China Daily, December 16, 2015, avail-
able at:  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/2015-12/16/content_22728202.
htm accessed on 24 August 2017
72  Safe Internet Forum (2016) Moscow saf-
er internet Forum adopts Russia-China cybersecurity 
cooperation roadmap, 29 April. Available at: http://safeinternetforum.ru/en/novosti/
moscow-safer-internet-forum-adopts-russia-china-cybersecurity-cooperation-road-
map.html accessed on 24 August 2017
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Affairs and the Cyberspace Administration of China jointly released 
a White Paper, ‘International strategy of cooperation on cyberspace’, 
which asserts that, as a basic norm in international relations, the principle 
of territorial sovereignty includes cyberspace.73 The protection of 
sovereignty in cyberspace is also one of the ways for ensuring national 
security according to the Law of Cyber-security of China.74
China deploys the principle of cyber sovereignty in order to stress 
the need for an inter-governmental approach to cyber regulation in 
contradistinction to the mainly western multi-stakeholder approach and 
it also deploys the principle of sovereignty in order to protect its internal 
sovereignty in the sense of protecting its exclusive and supreme power 
over its territory and people.75 In the latter instance,  cyber sovereignty 
for China denotes power over the state’s cyber infrastructure and over 
the information entering or becoming available within its sovereign 
domain. The manner in which China asserts its cyber sovereignty is 
through filtering, Filtering involves technical, political, legal, or social 
techniques to deny access to certain information or activities from the 
state or deny such information or activities entry into the sovereign 
space of a state. For example, the content of information is filtered on 
the basis of political, social, security or other grounds.76 Such national 
73  Available at: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2017-03/02/content_28410278.
htm accessed on 24 August 2017
74  Available at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-new-cybersecurity-law accessed on 
24 August 2017
75  Yi Shen “Cyber Sovereignty and the Governance of Global 
Cyberspace:  Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev. (2016), 81–93, 90 
‘ … cyber sovereignty can be understood: the first 
key parts of cyber sovereignty refers to the sovereignty of the state to manage the 
information flow inside the territory; the second is that every single state has the 
power to make cyber related policy independently; the third is that every state 
should have roughly equalized rights to participate in the decision making process 
of the rules, norms, or code of conduct that governs global cyberspace; and the 
respect of sovereignty should be one of the most important guiding principles to 
deal with cyber related issues internationally’.
76  Ronald J. Deibert, “The geopolitics of internet control: censorship, sovereignty, and 
cyberspace” in Andrew Chadwick & Philip N. Howard, eds., The Routledge Hand-
book of Internet Politics, Routledge, 2009, p. 323-36; Jonathan Zittrain , John Palfrey, 
Ron Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Access denied: The practice and policy of global 
internet filtering, MIT Press, 2008; Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski 
& Jonathan Zittrain, , Access controlled: The shaping of power, rights, and rule in 
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restrictions and control over the flow of information was dubbed as the 
‘Great Firewall of China’ or less charitably as “information curtain”.77 
A more advanced method of asserting sovereignty in cyberspace 
is the creation of national cyberspace zones by disconnecting national 
networks from the world wide web and by creating a national internet. 
North Korea’s ‘Kwangmyong’ internet or Iran’s ‘Halal internet’ are 
such examples.78 The North Korean internet consists of a search engine, 
news, email, and a browser and, according to reports, it has only 28 
websites.79 Iran’s ‘national internet’ replaces the existing system of 
filtering the internet and is based on domestic hosting, internet protocol 
network and fibre optic networks.80 
These examples show that states can curve their own sovereign 
cyberspace by erecting borders through technical means in order to 
control activities from outside or in order to insulate national services.81 
cyberspace, MIT Press, 2010. 
77  Jill Dougherty & Doug Gross, “Clinton: Internet ‘information curtain’ is dropping” 
(21 January 2010), available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/TECH/01/21/clinton.in-
ternet/index.html, accessed on 24 August 2017.
78  Simurgh Aryan, Homa Aryan, J. Alex Halderman, “Internet censorship in Iran: A 
first look” Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communica-
tions on the Internet, August 2013; Warf, B. (2015); “The Hermit Kingdom in cyber-
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These borders correspond to the physical borders delimiting and 
defining state sovereignty but they also reaffirm state sovereignty in 
its political, social, economic, cultural and territorial organisation. 
Above all, it shows how states project the Westphalian concept of state 
sovereignty to cyberspace. Whether such a Westphalian ‘moment’ will 
lead to the division of cyberspace into sovereign zones depends on 
many factors. Whereas technology is an important factor because it can 
assist in actually curving cyberspace in the same way that the territorial 
notion of sovereignty was facilitated by technological advances such as 
in cartography which permitted the demarcation of expanses of territory 
in an abstract manner,82 it is mainly political, economic and a number 
of other factors that are the primary motivators of such curving. For 
example, an open or closed cyberspace depends on political approaches 
to regulation, on states’ approaches to sovereignty, on the relationship 
between citizens, society and the government as well as on the economic 
or other benefits states expect to gain from cyberspace. It is interesting in 
this regard to recall how Major General Hao Yeli of the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army divides cyber sovereignty into three levels. According 
to him, at the bottom level, that of cyberinfrastructure, ‘states should be 
willing to collectively transfer authority in the interest of standardization 
and interconnectivity’; at the middle level of application ‘the degree of 
cyber sovereignty should be adapted to local conditions’  whereas at 
the top level of ‘regime, law, political security, and ideology, which is 
unchallengeable and includes the governing foundations and embodies the 
core interests of the country’, the leading role of the 
government remains. 83  
Although the above relate to active assertions of sovereignty in 
cyberspace, it should be noted that the opposite trend namely, states 
not claiming sovereignty in cyberspace or states promoting common 
regulatory regimes to maintain the common use of cyberspace84 are 
82  Jordan Branch, The Cartographic State: Maps, Territory, and the Origins of Sov-
ereignty, CUP, 2014.
83  Hao Yeli, “A Three-Perspective Theory of Cyber Sovereignty” see note 69, 113-4
84  For cyberspace as a global commons see Dan Hunter, “Cyberspace as place and 
the tragedy of the digital anticommons” California Law Review, vol. 91, no. 2, 2003, 
p. 439; Abraham M. Denmark & James Mulvenon, eds., Contested Commons: The 
Future of American Power in a Multipolar World, Centre for New American Century, 
2010.
Nicholas Tsaugourias
550
also expressions of state sovereignty. Unilateral or collective abstention 
from the exercise of sovereign rights as well as voluntary limitations on 
sovereign rights are indeed expressions of state sovereignty.85  
The question I want to explore is whether cyberspace can itself 
become sovereign. If sovereignty represents a claim over a portion of 
territory or otherwise over a space, cyberspace is such a space having, 
as was said, a physical, logical and social component. The difficulty 
however with the idea of sovereign cyberspace is that its physical and 
social components can never be disassociated from existing states; 
objects and people exist within states. Moreover, whereas in the physical 
world people or powerful authorities can claim a portion of territory as 
in the exercise of the right to self-determination and, if successful, create 
their own state with distinct borders separating themselves from people 
and objects residing in other territories, neither objects nor persons 
can move to cyberspace and sever their links with their own states. 
People may move certain activities and actions to cyberspace, they may 
experience cyberspace or they may nooumentally inhabit cyberspace 
but they can never remove themselves from the real world. This means 
that cyberspace and its organisation cannot be independent of states 
and therefore cyberspace cannot be sovereign because the authority 
in cyberspace is mediated by states. As for the purely virtual part of 
cyberspace, it cannot be sovereign because an inanimate, ethereal, 
space cannot be sovereign.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The article portrayed constitutive and functional relationship be-
tween borders and territory with the institution of the state and inter-
national law. Borders were claimed to define territories and further 
determine which states and over which sovereignty can be exercised. 
Consequently, international law as the creation of sovereign states is 
dependent on borders. The article then explored the question of how 
the relationship between borders and territory manifests itself in cy-
berspace. It does so in the process of territorialisation of cyberspace in 
85  Case of the S.S. “Wimbledon” (17 August 1923) PCIJ Reports, Series A, no. 1, p. 
25.
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the sense of extending territorial notions of sovereignty and of interna-
tional law to cyberspace with respect to activities, persons and objects. 
This relationship also manifests itself in the curving of national cyber 
zones. As to whether cyberspace itself can become sovereign, the ar-
ticle claimed that authority in cyberspace cannot be decoupled from 
real people and objects over whom states exercise sovereignty. Conse-
quently, cyberspace cannot be sovereign in itself. 
The question then is not whether cyberspace is subject to territori-
ally bounded notions of sovereignty and international law but about 
the scope of state sovereignty over cyberspace and in cyberspace. This 
is a political question for individual states but also for the society of 
states. It is a question whose answer depends on states’ political, legal, 
economic, social, and cultural interests, on perceptions about what is 
cyberspace or what cyberspace should be and on how states’ interests 
are promoted, facilitated or constrained by or in cyberspace.
